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ABSTRACT 
 
“I’m the Decider”: Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions in America. (May 2009) 
Samuel Stewart Snideman, B.S., Indiana State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
 Scholars have long been interested in how presidents make decisions in foreign 
policy. Often, the theories about foreign policy decision making focus on the choice to 
use or not use one particular foreign policy tool. Many studies often ignore or underplay 
the importance of domestic politics to foreign policy decisions. In this thesis, I ask how 
do American presidents choose which foreign policy tool to use in a given situation? I 
propose a domestic politics-based explanation, relying on presidential ideology, 
performance of the domestic economy, divided government, and the electoral clock. I 
use a simultaneous equations framework to model the choice between using “sticks” (i.e. 
military force and economic sanctions) and “carrots” (economic aid and military aid). 
The results provide qualified support for the domestic politics theory. Domestic 
politics matters for some types of foreign policy decisions but not for others. Presidential 
ideology and domestic economic performance condition presidential decisions to use 
force. Election timing is also important; presidents choose to use less politically costly 
foreign policy tools late in their term. The results also demonstrate that there is a 
connection between the decision to use military force and to use economic sanctions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg was a great opponent of the domestic policies of 
the Roosevelt administration and was, for most of his Senate career, an isolationist. 
Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Vandenberg abandoned isolationism in favor of a more internationalist view of foreign 
policy, working closely with the Truman administration on foreign affairs while 
remaining a critic of Truman’s domestic policies (Tompkins 1971). The idea that politics 
stops at the water’s edge comes from Vandenberg, and has often been repeated by 
politicians to show that America speaks with one voice to the rest of the world. 
 As pleasant as Senator Vandenberg’s sentiments are, we do know that politics 
has a large effect on an American president’s decisions in foreign policy (Putnam 1988; 
Wang 1996; Howell and Pevehouse 2005). Scholars have examined how domestic 
politics effects a president’s decision to use force (Meernik 2001), to sanction (Drury 
2000), or to give foreign aid (Meernik and Poe 1996). However, most research on 
presidential foreign policy making examines the use of foreign policy tools in isolation 
from a president’s other potential choices in foreign policy; that is, most research 
presents the foreign policy choice as “X/not X” rather than as a choice between “X, Y, 
and Z.” As a consequence, much of the work on American foreign policy has not 
presented a particularly realistic picture of a president’s decision making process. 
Presidents can use carrots (foreign aid, increased trade), sticks (military force, economic 
sanctions), or both.   
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of The American Political Science Review. 
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 The field of foreign policy analysis needs to gain a better understanding of the 
domestic and foreign policy trade-offs that exist for presidents when they decide which 
foreign policy tool to use. That is, presidents face different risks and rewards depending 
on their choice of foreign policy. My research will focus on this issue. I am interested in 
the following question: how do American presidents choose their foreign policies among 
the range of alternatives available to them? Certainly, there are many potential answers 
to this question. Here, I focus on one particular answer: domestic politics. 
 Below, I develop a framework for understanding how domestic considerations 
inform and constrain an American president when he must choose from a range of 
potential foreign policies. Specifically, my theory relies on the role played by the 
American Congress and the role played by the domestic economy in limiting what a 
president can do in the international arena. I argue that divided government, the electoral 
clock, and a bad economy may force presidents to make choices that for them are sub-
optimal from an ideological or partisan perspective. 
 In the pages that follow, I discuss the previous work on foreign policy decision 
making. Following this discussion, I turn to my own theory and develop seven testable 
hypotheses. I then present my research design. I conduct a number of tests of the 
hypotheses, which show qualified support for some of the theoretical expectations. I 
conclude with some summary comments on the implications of this research for scholars 
and policy makers. 
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2. PREVIOUS WORK 
 Scholars studying foreign policy attempt to explain leader decision making in a 
variety of ways. However, these disparate theories can be usefully categorized as 
belonging to one of two types: isolated and encompassing. Most scholars present 
theories that are of the isolated variety. These theories focus on the choice and use of a 
foreign policy tool in isolation from the other options available to a leader. The choice 
facing American presidents is often portrayed in the literature as a choice, for example, 
between using military force versus not using military force, rather than using force 
versus using economic sanctions versus giving aid. Additionally, these theories typically 
are applicable to only a limited set of circumstances. Far less often, scholars develop 
theories that are of the encompassing variety; these theories attempt to be more general 
and to understand more fully the decision making process of leaders. Each of these 
categories is discussed in greater detail below. 
2.1. Isolated Theories of Foreign Policy 
 While most of the theories of international relations represent scholarly attempts 
to explain what drives leaders to action, many of these theories are of the isolated 
variety, which is to say that they focus on only the decision to use one tool in isolation 
from the other tools available to leaders. Most empirical studies of foreign policy 
making are based on theories which are limited in scope and, thus, limited in their ability 
to tell us much about the big picture of foreign policy. A number of examples will better 
illustrate what is meant by this. 
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 Scholars studying war and peace offer many theories focusing on domestic 
politics to explain why leaders choose to use force against other states. Diversionary 
theory, as elaborated by Levy (1988) and James and Oneal (1991), is a way of 
explaining the effect of declines in either presidential approval or economic performance 
on presidential uses of force. In this theory, presidents would use force against other 
states to achieve domestic political gains (e.g. increased popularity among the electorate 
or to detract attention away from a poor economy). There is much debate over the extent 
to which presidents benefit from using force in diversionary ways. Some studies have 
found support for the diversionary hypothesis (Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and 
Bickers 1992; DeRouen 2000), while others have found little evidence of diversionary 
behavior (Meernik 1994; Gowa 1998; Meernik 2001). 
 Scholars propose other theories of war centered on domestic politics. For 
example, Stoll (1984) finds that there are fewer visible uses of force by presidents during 
presidential election years. In line with these findings, Gaubatz (1991) argues that war is 
a matter of electoral timing: when democracies fight wars, these wars are more likely to 
happen early in an election cycle. In his study of US dispute behavior, Clark (2000) finds 
that when the president and the Congress have similar policy preferences, the US 
engages in more militarized disputes. He also finds the corollary: disputes are less likely 
and are shorter under periods of divided government. And Wang’s (1996) study of 
presidential responses to foreign policy crises finds that US responses will be more 
severe when there are high levels of economic misery and when there is unified 
government.  
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 Military force is not the only tool which has been the subject of isolated 
theorizing by political scientists. Studies of another punitive tool at the disposal of 
presidents, economic sanctions, are likewise narrow in their focus. Indeed, the decision 
by presidents to sanction is an understudied one. Works by Drezner (1997; 1998) and 
Drury (2000; 2001) represent the bulk of the scholarly attempts to explain why leaders 
decide to initiate sanctions against other states. Drezner’s (1998) work models the 
decision to sanction as, in part, a function of the sender’s expectations of future conflict 
with the target. Drury’s (2000; 2001) theory relies on both relations with the target 
country and US domestic factors, though in Drury’s estimation the domestic factors are 
of less importance than are the target country relations. Thus, for Drury, the decision to 
sanction is an attempt at coercive diplomacy, not a reaction by presidents to domestic 
political considerations. 
 Leaders use sanctions for a host of reasons. An executive may use economic 
sanctions to send a message to international actors (Schwebach 2000) or to alter existing 
norms or legal precedents (Barber 1979; Fisk 2000). But leaders may also use economic 
sanctions for domestic political purposes, beyond those listed above. Some scholars, for 
example, argue that domestic political and economic conditions can facilitate or hinder 
the use of economic sanctions by political executives (Lindsay 1986; Simon 1996; Smith 
1996). For example, Lindsay (1986) argues that presidents can use economic sanctions 
as a way of increasing their popularity at home; the one example of this in the American 
context was when Jimmy Carter employed economic sanctions against Iran in 1979 and 
was rewarded with a twenty-nine point increase in his job approval (167).  
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 Non-punitive tools, the “carrots” in foreign policy, are also the focus of the same 
troublesome way of theorizing that military force and economic sanctions have been 
subject to. Scholars in political science and economics attempt to understand how 
leaders decide to give foreign economic aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that aid 
allocation decisions are driven as much by political and strategic calculations as they are 
by anything else. Fleck and Kilby (2006) examine the role played by domestic politics in 
American decisions to give aid, finding that the partisan composition of Congress and 
the White House influences which of the four aid allocation criteria (development, 
strategic importance, commercial importance, democratization) are most important at the 
time an aid decision is made. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) theorize that leaders 
give aid in deals to extract policy concessions from targets. 
 The main shortcoming of these theories is that they do not adequately describe 
the decision process faced by presidents. Most scholars study foreign policy using a 
variety of piecemeal approaches. In each case, the decision to act (whether the action is 
the use of force, the initiation of sanctions, or the allocation of aid) is isolated from all of 
the other potential choices available to presidents. Presidents do not make decisions in a 
vacuum; they make decisions in the presence of a multitude of options and with 
numerous voices (both domestic and international) attempting to influence the ultimate 
decision. 
2.2. Encompassing Theories of Foreign Policy 
 These theories have broader applicability to foreign policy than do the isolated 
theories. They are not theories about a specific foreign policy tool, but are more about 
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how leaders decide which tool to use. Two prominent examples should better illustrate 
this point. 
 The first example is that of poliheuristic theory. Mintz (2004) provides an 
excellent overview of this approach. In his words, 
Poliheuristic (PH) choice theory postulates a two-stage decision process 
in which the menu of choices is narrowed initially by a noncompensatory 
analysis that eliminates options by the use of one or more heuristics 
(cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternatives are then evaluated in an 
attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (3). 
This description seems to show that PH theory is widely applicable to the various tools 
used by leaders in foreign policy. While it may have the potential to be a more general 
theory of foreign policy decision making, it has principally been used by scholars in the 
realm of security studies (Mintz 1993; Mintz and Geva 1993; DeRouen 2003).  
 A second encompassing theory is that of Morgan and Palmer (1997). Building 
upon Most and Starr (1984), Morgan and Palmer develop a theory of foreign policy 
substitutability. The argument, as Morgan and Palmer note, is that states have “multiple 
ways for dealing with any particular stimulus from the outside environment” (2000, 11). 
To explain how leaders choose from among these alternatives, Morgan and Palmer 
propose what they call the two-good theory of foreign policy. This theory is based on the 
assumption that states pursue two goals: security (the maintenance of the status quo) and 
proaction (changes to the status quo). The ability of states to achieve these goals is 
largely determined by the international environment and the power of the state under 
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examination (Morgan and Palmer 1997, 241). What influence substitutability in the 
Morgan and Palmer model? The authors propose three things: (1) a change in the 
efficiency of the policy for attaining the two goods (security and proaction), (2) a change 
in the state’s resources available for foreign policy, and/or (3) a change in the relative 
salience of security versus proaction (Morgan and Palmer 2000, 29-30). The two-good 
theory has been shown to have applicability in a number of different areas of foreign 
policy, including dispute resolution and initiation (Morgan and Palmer 1997), foreign aid 
allocation (Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002), and alliance behavior (Morgan and 
Palmer 2003). While these studies still focus on the decision to use only one foreign 
policy tool, they demonstrate the generality of the theory of substitution proposed by 
Morgan and Palmer. 
 Despite their advantages over isolated theories of foreign policy, the 
encompassing theories also have limitations. None of the approaches fully takes into 
account the role of domestic politics as a constraint on the ability of leaders to make 
decisions in foreign policy. Even those theories that do consider the role of domestic 
politics (e.g. PH theory) are often underspecified.  
 Some of the theories posit a sequential process of choice; in PH theory, for 
example, the decision is a two-step process. This is limiting, as the choices made by 
leaders from a range of options may not be made in a sequential fashion. Additionally, 
despite the seeming applicability across a range of foreign policy choices, the theories 
discussed here seem to still focus too heavily on the realm of national security. 
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 Finally, with the exception of Morgan and Palmer (2000), these approaches do 
not explicitly deal with the trade-offs that exist among policy alternatives. Few works 
deal with the issue of how leaders choose between two or more different sub-sets of 
policies (e.g. economic sanctions, military sanctions, and withholding aid) where trade-
offs exist between the effectiveness of the tools and the political costs of the tools’ 
employment. 
 What is needed, then, is a theory of foreign policy that (1) captures the 
importance of domestic political factors and (2) provides a more comprehensive 
approach to understanding how leaders choose from among the range of foreign policy 
options available to them. In the next section, I provide what I believe is a theory that 
serves both of these ends. 
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 I am interested in understanding why executives do what they do. More 
specifically, the question I hope to provide an answer to is how to American presidents 
choose their foreign policies? The American president faces a multitude of competing 
interests whenever he makes a policy decision. When a president is considering some 
domestic policy decision, he must consider not only his own political and ideological 
preferences, but also the preferences of interest groups (Edwards and Wayne 1990, 12), 
the policy positions of the median legislator or the veto pivot in Congress (Krehbiel 
1998; Cameron 2000), and the president’s constituents (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
2002; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). To paraphrase Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson, and Morrow (2003), presidents must satisfy their domestic winning coalition 
when making policy decisions. 
 This is a highly idealized account of the decision making process with respect to 
domestic policy issues. But how would the process work in the foreign policy sphere? 
Figure 1 provides an outline of the decision process facing American presidents with 
respect to foreign policy decisions. For the most part, presidents face a process that is 
similar in many respects to the one they face when making decisions on domestic policy. 
The president still faces competing sets of pressures and influence. He still has to deal 
with domestic interest groups, the legislature, and the like. He also has to deal with 
pressures from the international community, especially if the foreign policy problem 
calls for a military response. And when facing a problem from a foreign state, a 
president must account for certain characteristics of that state: whether or not it is an 
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ally, what actions by the target created the need for a response, the importance of the 
target as a trading partner, and the target’s relative power and capabilities. In effect, an 
American president must consider both the utility he gains from using a given foreign 
policy tool and the threat posed by the target state. These pressures exert independent 
influence on the president, who must ultimately make his decision. Scholars have 
examined the role of the international environment (Gourevitch 1978; Waltz 1979; 
Ostrom and Job 1986; Mearsheimer 2001). My theory concerns the other set of 
influences that work on presidents: domestic political factors. 
 
 
Figure 1: An Idealized View of the Decision Process 
Foreign Policy Problem DECISION Decision Outcome
Domestic
International
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It is easy to think that presidents face costs with all foreign policy decisions, from 
the minor (e.g. giving economic aid to St. Vincent and the Grenadines) to the major (e.g. 
invading Afghanistan and Iraq). For some scholars, these costs are conceptualized as 
being of the material variety (Fearon 1995; Goldstein 2004). Regardless of the foreign 
policy tool, the material costs will usually be high in absolute terms: armies are not 
cheap to equip and train, a $50 million aid package is not cheap to give, and severe 
economic sanctions can hurt domestic business interests. 
Material costs, however, are not the only costs leaders must consider. In all 
polities, and especially in democratic ones, leaders face political costs (Bueno de 
Mesquita, et al 2003). It is useful to disaggregate political costs into two distinct 
varieties: electoral costs and legislative costs. The electoral cost story is a familiar one: 
politicians in the United States must stand for periodic re-election, and thus must supply 
voters with sufficiently compelling reasons to retain incumbent leaders. For Bueno de 
Mesquita, et al (2003), the office holder must supply a specified winning coalition with a 
suitable share of private goods in order to continue to govern. 
Legislative costs are just as important when leaders are crafting foreign policy. In 
the US, a natural divide exists between the president and the Congress, owing to the fact 
that the Framers established a system of separate powers in government. Even where the 
White House and the Capitol are controlled by members of the same party, there is 
rarely perfect congruence in the preferences of the two institutions. This tension is 
potential exacerbated by the fact that the power of the president in domestic politics is 
often the power of persuasion (Neustadt 1960). Thus for the president to accomplish his 
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political agenda he needs to account for how any policy will play out domestically, as an 
unpopular policy choice could lead to Congress’s refusal to work with the president on 
the rest of his agenda. When there are cases of divided government, the potential costs 
for choosing an unpopular or politically imprudent course of action in foreign policy are 
even higher. Congress is even more likely to take action against other items on the 
president’s foreign policy agenda (or, even worse, on his domestic policy agenda). 
Congress, after all, not only controls budgets but also has influence over a wide array of 
domestic policy concerns. And recent work has shown that Congress is able, from time 
to time, to alter the ability of presidents to engage in aggressive foreign policy (Clark 
2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Johnson 2006).  
Taken together, I expect the decision a president makes in the realm of foreign 
policy to be conditioned by both the anticipated electoral costs facing the president as 
well as the anticipated legislative costs he may face in choosing a policy he prefers but 
that the Congress does not. Thus, I expect that for US presidents a number of competing 
factors will shape their decisions with respect to which tool to employ in a given 
situation. Figure 2 outlines this process. In the figure, the president faces a generic 
foreign policy problem (e.g. a poor human rights situation in a foreign country). The 
president is then faced with a much larger concern: how best to resolve this problem. 
Presidents, as has been noted, have many tools available to them. Each choice carries 
with it certain political costs, both electoral and legislative.1 These political costs exert 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that each choice has a varying probability of success and a variable utility for 
presidents. I, however, am only interested in the role of political costs, and am less concerned with the 
question of how the probability of success of the policy conditions a president’s choice of foreign policy. 
Future research can better account for this factor. 
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independent influences on the president’s choice. But note the overlapping nature of the 
electoral and legislative costs. This is because the electoral costs also influence members 
of Congress, as public opinion can be turned on Congress by the president (and vice-
versa). Thus, the political costs work together on a president, who ultimately makes a 
choice about which tools to use. 
 
 
Figure 2: Presidents and Political Costs 
Foreign Policy Problem
Legislative
Electoral
Decision Outcome
 
 
 
 
When are the trade-offs likely to manifest themselves? That is, when should we 
expect legislative concerns to trump electoral concerns, and vice-versa? Depending on 
the point at which the decision is made, a number of factors can shape the president’s 
 15 
decision. At the beginning of a term, for example, the president should have a 
“honeymoon period” during which the legislative branch will be more accommodating 
of his preferred policies (see, for example, McCarty 1997). His position in office is also 
secure, with his next election four years away. At the beginning of his term, then, 
presidential choices should be driven primarily by the president’s ideological 
preferences and what he may perceive to be his mandate. 
When the honeymoon is over, and the president’s popularity among the public 
recedes, legislative concerns may surface as the most relevant domestic consideration for 
a president facing a foreign policy choice. The Congress possesses a number of formal 
and informal means of limiting the power of the president in both the domestic and 
foreign policy arenas (Fisher 1998). Even under situations of unified government, the 
Congress may use these powers to constrain a president’s foreign policy. Under 
situations of divided government, these powers become more important and may be used 
with greater frequency. In these circumstances, the Congress may force the president to 
choose between his preferred foreign policies and his preferred domestic policies.  
As elections near, presidents will need the support of the mass public in order to 
retain office. Thus, presidents will be constrained in their responses to foreign policy 
problems by what the public wants. We should expect presidents to choose less costly or 
less controversial policies late in their terms, as these policy choices may jeopardize the 
electoral prospects of the incumbent office holder. While it is possible that presidents 
may choose to use diversionary force near an election in an effort to bolster their 
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electoral prospects, research by Gaubatz (1991) suggests that presidents will elect to be 
more cautious (and thus less conflict-prone) near an election. 
Again, I argue that both legislative and electoral factors will influence the 
decisions of presidents when they face foreign policy problems. First, I expect that 
legislative factors will play an important role. For example, presidents facing a divided 
government at home will have a harder time pursuing aggressive foreign policies. Not 
only that, it mal also be more difficult for presidents to achieve any significant 
involvement in foreign affairs that does not arise from a crisis situation. Both large-scale 
(e.g. nation-building efforts) and small-scale (e.g. increasing the foreign aid budget) 
projects may be difficult to pursue during situations of divided government. 
At the same time, a president must keep his other eye on the public. Sobel (2001) 
argues that public opinion constrains American foreign policy. Scholars also note that 
presidents have other electoral considerations to which they must pay attention, most 
notably the electoral clock and satisfying constituent needs (Gaubatz 1991; Koch 2009). 
From this general theoretical framework, I offer a number of hypotheses about the trade-
offs faced by presidents between various tools of foreign policy and then to employ 
them. 
As noted above, because presidents must satisfy domestic coalitions to remain in 
office, the ideology of the president is likely to influence what type of policy they 
choose. Research shows that political position (in terms of placement on the left-right 
ideological spectrum) constrains leaders’ foreign policies in democracies (Palmer, 
London, and Regan 2004). Left-oriented presidents (i.e. Democrats) are more likely to 
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choose tools that do not rely on military action, while presidents who are right-oriented 
(i.e. Republicans) are more likely to use military force as a policy option. Since 
presidents have different views on the use of force, we would also expect presidents to 
have different views on foreign aid. This leads to the first two hypotheses: 
H1: Republican presidents are more likely to choose to use military force, 
while Democratic presidents are more likely to choose to use economic 
sanctions. 
H2: Democratic presidents are more likely to give higher levels of 
economic aid, while Republican presidents are more likely to give higher 
levels of military aid. 
 Also noted above were the constraints that divided government place upon 
presidents in the realm of foreign policy. Republican presidents, given their ideology, 
should be more willing to use force to resolve international problems than would 
Democratic members of Congress. Should a Republican choose to use military force 
while he finds himself in a situation of divided government (where Democrats control 
one or both chambers of Congress), his ability to achieve domestic policy success could 
be threatened. A similar set of constraints should work for Democratic presidents facing 
a Republican Congress; Democratic presidents may feel that they have to be more 
hawkish in foreign policy than their ideology would otherwise dictate. These constraints 
lead to the third and fourth hypotheses: 
 18 
H3: Republican presidents facing situations of divided government will 
be less likely to choose to use military force than they would under 
situations of unified government. 
H4: Democratic presidents facing situations of divided government will 
be more likely to choose to use military force than they would under 
situations unified government. 
 The electoral clock also shapes a president’s choice of foreign policy. In the 
United States, where the electoral cycle is fixed, presidents must be careful in how they 
choose to operate. A president’s choice to employ force against another country, for 
example, can be politically disastrous for a president if the use of force proves 
unsuccessful or unpopular. This damage can be even greater if the use of force is 
conducted near the end of the electoral cycle, which explains Gaubatz’s (1991) finding 
that the US engages in fewer uses of military force late in the election cycle. This leads 
to hypothesis five: 
H5: A president’s use of force is more likely to occur early in a 
president’s term, while sanctions are more likely to occur later during a 
president’s term. 
 Another key element of the domestic political picture is economic performance. 
When the economy is bad, fewer people will want their tax dollars to be spent on war or 
foreign aid. However, the indicators of poor economic performance can have different 
effects on a president’s decision. Research suggests that when the domestic economy is 
bad, US presidents are more likely to use force in world politics (Fordham 1998b). The 
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parties, however, respond differently to different indicators of poor economic 
performance because they have distinctive preferences regarding macroeconomic policy 
(Boix 1998). Republican presidents are more likely to engage in diversionary uses of 
force when unemployment is high, because Republican presidents are more reluctant to 
use inflationary macroeconomic policies to resolve unemployment issues. Conversely, 
Democrats are more likely than Republicans to use force when inflation is high 
(Fordham 1998c). Other work has shown that differing economic interests can interact 
with political party to shape foreign policy preferences, even when security issues are 
salient (Fordham 1998a). I focus on the role of unemployment and inflation in 
hypotheses six and seven: 
H6: When inflation is high, Republican presidents will be less involved in 
foreign affairs. 
H7: When unemployment is high, Democratic presidents will be less 
involved in foreign affairs. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 I analyze these hypotheses using a sample of American foreign policy decisions 
over a period of twenty years (1981-2000). I omit from the analyses countries that are 
members of the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
as these states are against which the US is unlikely to employ sanctions or military force. 
The hypotheses are tested on of the remaining countries during that time period. 
 To test these hypotheses, I employ two statistical techniques. First, to test the 
hypothesized relationships individually, I use cross-sectional time-series regression 
(xtreg in STATA) or probit, depending on the nature of the dependent variable. I do this 
for each of the foreign policy tools (foreign economic aid, foreign military aid, economic 
sanctions, and military intervention) under study. To test for the existence of trade-offs, I 
use a simultaneous equations framework (Schendel and Patton 1978; DeRouen 1995). 
For the aid variables, I use seemingly unrelated regression. For the sanctions and force 
variables, I use a maximum likelihood technique known as bivariate probit analysis. The 
hypotheses were tested using STATA (v. 9.2). 
 While the theory above relates to decisions made by American presidents from a 
range of possible choices, the hypotheses which I derive consider choices from within 
two sub-sets of policy choices: sticks (economic sanctions and military force) and 
carrots (military aid and economic aid). I structure my hypothesis tests in this way 
primarily for practical reasons: the simultaneous equations frameworks are difficult to 
use when there are four dependent variables under study.2 
                                                 
2
 In future research, I plan to conduct analyses that include all four DVs in a single econometric model. 
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4.1 Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables in this study are three foreign policy tools commonly 
used by American presidents: foreign aid, economic sanctions, and military force. 
Foreign aid is operationalized in two ways: as economic aid and as military aid. The two 
aid variables are continuous measures of US aid to a target country. The variables are 
measured in millions of constant US dollars with a 2005 base. The data for these 
variables were collected from the US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s 
online Greenbook. 
 My measure of military force comes from Fordham and Sarver (2001). They 
coded all US uses of force, from the major (Persian Gulf War) to the minor (shows of 
US ships of the Haitian coast in 1889) between 1870 and 1995. Using this data, I created 
a dichotomous dependent variable, where I coded “1” if the US engaged in a use of force 
against the target country in a given year and “0” otherwise. Because the data ends in 
1995, I updated Fordham and Sarver’s data through 2000 using Maoz’s (2005) Dyadic 
Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset. 
 Data for the economic sanctions variables comes from Morgan, Krustev, and 
Bapat’s (2007) Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset. This dataset includes 
information on both the threat by the US to use economic sanctions against a target and 
the actual employment of sanctions against said target. Here, the use of sanctions is 
measured as a dichotomous variable. I created the variable following the standard 
dichotomous coding (“1” if the US used sanctions against the target in a given year and 
“0” if the US did not use sanctions). I use the TIES data rather than the sanctions data of 
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Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) because the TIES data focuses on both “high 
profile” and “low profile” cases of economic sanctions and because it has a more 
comprehensive set of cases (Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009, 99). 
4.2 Independent & Control Variables 
 A number of independent and control variables are included in the models. First, 
I incorporate a number of domestic-level variables, which help me to understand the role 
that domestic political considerations play in shaping the executive’s decision calculus. 
First, a divided government measure was created. It is a dichotomous variable, 
employing the standard coding for variables of this type (“1” if divided government 
exists during a given year, “0” otherwise). If the White House and at least one chamber 
of the Congress are controlled by different parties, I consider there to be a situation of 
divided government. 
 I also use a measure of presidential ideology. I use the partisanship of the 
president as a proxy for his ideology. I created a dichotomous variable, coding “1” for 
Republican presidents and coding “0” for Democratic ones. 
 To measure economic performance, I employ two variables. The first is US 
inflation. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators has a measure of inflation 
for all countries as an annual percentage. The second variable is US unemployment. The 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics maintains both monthly and annual data on 
unemployment from the 1940s through the present. The measure used here is the annual 
unemployment rate of the civilian non-institutional population. Because some of the 
hypotheses suggest an interactive effect between ideology and these domestic economic 
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factors, I created interaction terms for ideology and inflation an ideology and 
unemployment. 
 In addition, I control for a number of international-level factors that may 
influence a president’s foreign policy decision. One of these variables is from the 
Correlates of War dataset, generated by the EUGene data management program (Bennett 
and Stam 2000, v. 3.203). I control for the national capabilities of the target using the 
COW national capabilities index (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987). The 
composite index of national capabilities (CINC) is a weighted average of a state’s share 
of the international system’s total and urban populations, energy consumption, iron and 
steel production, and military personnel and expenditures. Presidents should not be 
expected to use military force against relatively powerful states. 
 In addition, I control for the number of years of peaceful relations between states 
using the cwpceyrs variable in the Maoz MIDs data (Maoz 2005), where the data was 
generated using the EUGene program. Cwpceyrs is a measure of the number of years 
since the end of the last militarized dispute between the US and the target state. One 
should expect that a history of peaceful relations between the US and any given state in 
the international system will lead to a continuance of peaceful relations (i.e. absence of 
armed conflict, sanctions episodes, and a continuance of foreign aid) in the future, at 
least in general terms. 
 We should also expect restraint on the part of presidents when the target is a 
valued trading partner or if the state is strategically important. Data on trade dependence 
comes from Gledtisch (2002). Gleditsch coded bilateral trade flows for all country dyads 
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between 1948 and 2000 measured in millions of current-year US dollars. I use his data 
on US bilateral trade flows in order to create a measure of trade dependence on the US. 
This was done by adding all of the exports from the target to the US with imports from 
the US to the target and dividing that figure by the target state’s total trade. The result is 
a ratio of how dependent is the target on the US as a trading partner. 
 The strategic importance variable is a lagged value of the military aid measure 
described above. In the use of force and sanctions models, military aid is a proxy for 
importance, as the US would not give military aid to those states which the US did not 
consider to be important strategically. 
 Finally, I control for several of the target’s domestic-level characteristics: regime 
type, political stability, the target’s record on human rights, and target gross domestic 
product (GDP). I control for democracy because of the numerous empirical findings 
related to the democratic peace; regime type, for whatever reason, seems to constrain 
leaders in their use of force and seems to spur close economic ties (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, 
and Russett 1996; Oneal and Russett 1999; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003). Data for 
the democracy measure come from the Polity IV dataset (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). 
 The measure of political stability I use comes from the Major Episodes of 
Political Violence (MEPV) dataset (Marshall 2006). This dataset contains a measure of 
all societal episodes of political violence, including ethnic violence, ethnic war, civil 
violence, and civil war. The civtot variable in the data represents a total summed 
magnitude of all societal political violence in a target country. We should expect that 
presidents would have an interest in intervening (through the use of sticks like sanctions 
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or force, or through the use of carrots like giving aid for policy concessions as in Bueno 
de Mesquita and Smith 2007) in cases of political instability. 
 Related to this is a country’s record on human rights. Data for the human rights 
measure come from Cingranelli and Richards (2009) human rights dataset. The dataset 
contains an additive measure of a target government’s respect for the physical integrity 
of its citizens. This measure is constructed on the basis of summing the values of the 
Cingranelli and Richards indicators of a government’s willingness to torture, use 
extrajudicial killings, to imprison political opponents, and to cause its citizens to 
“disappear.” The values of the physical integrity measure range from zero (which 
indicates no government respect for the rights of its citizens) to eight (which indicates 
total government respect for the rights of its citizens). Again, where a target state 
exhibits a poor record concerning human rights, the US may feel more international and 
domestic pressure to intervene in some way, even though the intervention could fall 
short of the use of actual military force. 
 In addition to the other target country control variables, I include a control for the 
target’s GDP. Data for this variable come from Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded Trade and 
GDP data. The figures on GDP are real figures in constant US dollars with a 1996 base. I 
control for the wealth of the target because rich states should need less aid (both of the 
economic and the military varieties), and this condition can influence presidential 
decisions to increase or decrease aid levels, or even the initial decision to give aid. 
 Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for each of these variables.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Name 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Military Force 2001 .0164918 .1273887 0 1 
Economic 
Sanctions 
2001 .0949525 .2932226 0 1 
Military Aid 2001 65.92164 318.7408 0 3180.8 
Economic Aid 2001 87.21804 246.7875 0 3134.7 
Unemployment 2001 6.230185 1.517633 4 9.7 
Inflation 2001 3.661169 1.758731 2 10 
Ideology 2001 .5432284 .4982523 0 1 
Divided Govt. 2001 .8890555 .3141419 0 1 
Political 
Stability 
2001 .9730135 1.987781 0 10 
Human Rights 2001 4.495752 2.247689 0 8 
Trade 2001 .1523773 .156691 0 .8141539 
Democracy 2001 .7411294 7.097954 -10 10 
GDP per 
capita 
2001 4504.231 4343.279 424.28 26904.5 
Power 2001 .0036809 .0083009 .000033 .068335 
Peace Years 2001 37.25587 33.00998 0 184 
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5. ANALYSIS 
 To begin, I tested the hypotheses about foreign policy decisions independent of 
one another; that is, I followed the conventional method of hypothesis testing with 
regard to how American political leaders choose their foreign policies. Then, in order to 
test for the existence of trade-offs, I conducted the hypothesis tests using simultaneous 
equation approaches. The results are discussed below. 
5.1 The Independent Tests 
 Table 2 lists the results of the probit analysis where the decision to use military 
force is the dependent variable. When one examines Table 2, several things stand out. 
First, few of the domestic political forces influence presidential decisions with respect to 
the use of force. In terms of the domestic political factors under study here, only the 
president’s ideology seemed to exert any influence on his decision to use force. This 
finding, however, was not in the expected direction; Bill Clinton, the lone Democrat in 
the model, was more likely to use force than were his Republican counterparts, Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush. However, the ideology-unemployment interaction term 
approached the .10 level of statistical significance, which would suggest that under 
instances of high unemployment Republican presidents would use force with greater 
frequency than their Democratic counterparts facing similar economic conditions. 
Neither of the economic measures proved significant, nor did they prove significant 
when interacted with the president’s ideology. Thus, we see little support thus far for 
hypotheses one, two, five, six, and seven. 
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 In terms of other findings, the model presents very intuitive results. For example, 
it demonstrates limited support for the democratic peace hypothesis. When the target is 
democratic, the US is less likely to use force against the target, even when OECD states 
are omitted from the model. In addition, the model shows that the US uses force less 
against wealthy states, state with which it has a peaceful history, and states that are 
respectful of human rights. 
 
 
Table 2: To Fight or Not to Fight? 
Variable Name Coefficient SE 
Unemployment -.1706683 .2722076 
Inflation -.0212717 .3935438 
Divided Govt. -.5022018 .5400159 
Ideology -2.567958* 1.433007 
Ideology*Unemployment -.1706683 .2722076 
Ideology*Inflation -.0212717 .3935438 
Electoral Cycle .0250383 .1216038 
Human Rights -.3694926*** .0601424 
Political Stability -.0427086 .0394868 
Democracy -.035879** .017574 
Power 10.61165 7.369429 
GDP per capita .0000794*** .000028 
Trade .3142507 .6769649 
Peace Years -.0055564* .0030753 
Military Aid (t-1) .0000124 .0002124 
CONSTANT -.0775058 1.790768 
N = 1802 
Log-likelihood = -126.6407 
* = p < .10 
** = p < .05 
*** = p < .01 
Note: Dependent variable is use of force by the United States. 
 
 
 
 Table 3 lists the probit results of the economic sanctions model. Again, the 
results are interesting. In terms of the independent variables of interest, presidential 
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ideology, divided government, and the US inflation rate are not statistically significant. 
The lone domestic indicator to reach one of the conventional levels of statistical 
significance is the US unemployment rate, and the results suggest that Democratic 
presidents are more likely to choose to employ economic sanctions when the US rate of 
unemployment is high. The interaction of presidential ideology and unemployment was 
likewise significant, which shows that Republican presidents facing high domestic 
unemployment use sanctions less than do their Democratic counterparts under similar 
domestic economic conditions. This suggests limited support for hypothesis one, that 
Democrats use economic sanctions more often than do Republican presidents. 
 
 
Table 3: The Choice to Sanction 
Variable Name Coefficient SE 
Unemployment .3456775** .1443679 
Inflation -.2348431 .2194898 
Divided Govt. .039744 .2501045 
Ideology .4391697 .7116848 
Ideology*Unemployment -.3079592** .1532921 
Ideology*Inflation .3054155 .2355048 
Electoral Cycle -.0879411 .0630713 
Human Rights -.1986662*** .027215 
Political Stability -.0775078*** .0264008 
Democracy -.0136445* .0083695 
Power 24.63125*** 4.371973 
GDP per capita .0000342** .0000153 
Trade 1.712066*** .3185324 
Peace Years -.0033683** .0015346 
Military Aid (t-1) -.0001263 .0001368 
CONSTANT -1.841351** .8455058 
N = 1802 
Log-likelihood = -462.39937 
* = p < .10 
** = p < .05 
*** = p < .01 
Note: Dependent variable is the use of economic sanctions by the United States. 
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 The other results in Table 3 are similar to those from Table 2: the target’s respect 
for human rights, the target’s level of democracy, and the target’s wealth remain 
significant and exert a negative influence on a president’s decision to use sanctions. 
Peaceful relations between the US and the target likewise keep the president from 
initiating economically punitive measures against the target. The US-target trade 
relationship is also significant and positive, suggesting that presidents employ sanctions 
against those who are dependent on the US for trade. This makes sense, as sanctions are 
likely to be most effective when used against states which are dependent upon the US. 
According to the model, US presidents use sanctions more often against powerful states. 
 What about the foreign policy “carrots?” Table 4 presents the regression results 
of the economic aid model. Domestic political factors appear to shape aid allocation 
decisions: when the economy is bad (specifically, when there is high unemployment), 
Democratic presidents give less aid. By contrast, Republican presidents give higher 
levels of economic aid than do their Democratic counterparts during periods of high 
unemployment, as indicated by the ideology-unemployment interaction term. The 
election cycle also seems to influence aid decisions in an unexpected way: more aid is 
given early in the election cycle. Finally, it should be noted that the lagged measure of 
economic aid is a very good predictor of current aid levels. 
 Target characteristics matter less for economic aid allocation decisions. Only two 
of these variables reached any of the conventional levels of significance: peaceful 
relations and target wealth. The model indicates that the US gives more to wealthy 
countries (though the magnitude of the effect appears quite small) and gives less to states 
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with which it has a peaceful history (though here, too, the magnitude of the effect is 
quite small). 
 
 
Table 4: Giving Economic Aid 
Variable Name Coefficient SE 
Unemployment -13.90704** 6.950805 
Inflation -5.76446 10.21088 
Divided Govt. -27.52857** 13.37322 
Ideology -86.75329*** 35.81275 
Ideology*Unemployment 16.48553** 7.37906 
Ideology*Inflation 4.17218 10.87166 
Electoral Cycle 5.45633* 2.932543 
Human Rights -.7547888 1.369266 
Political Stability 1.736977 1.413528 
Democracy .4743741 .4005533 
Power 203.2315 173.2834 
GDP per capita .0013641* .0007294 
Trade 11.66969 17.02605 
Peace Years -.1155644* .0800429 
Economic Aid (t-1) .8959623*** .00921 
CONSTANT 99.5919** 43.43554 
N = 1838 
Overall R2 = 0.856 
* = p < .10 
** = p < .05 
*** = p < .01 
Note: Dependent variable is the level of economic aid given to the target country at time t. 
 
 
  
Results for the military aid model are presented in Table 5. Domestic politics 
were much less important in presidential decisions related to military aid allocation. The 
only domestic political variables to reach any of the conventional levels of statistical 
significance were presidential ideology and the ideology-unemployment interaction 
terms. Republicans facing situations of high unemployment give more military aid, 
which is consistent with the prediction from hypothesis six. The only other statistically 
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significant predictor of military aid allocation decisions was, not unexpectedly, the 
lagged measure of military aid. None of the target characteristics seem to be important 
for military aid allocation decisions. 
 
 
Table 5: Giving Military Aid 
Variable Name Coefficient SE 
Unemployment -2.08247 4.047962 
Inflation 1.952136 5.95211 
Divided Govt. -2.905796 7.770536 
Ideology -47.22204** 20.86014 
Ideology*Unemployment 6.490922* 4.298943 
Ideology*Inflation .8309152 6.336803 
Electoral Cycle -1.233778 1.711452 
Human Rights -.8984922 .8066418 
Political Stability -.6275113 .8308618 
Democracy .019595 .2375201 
Power 36.4039 174.3235 
GDP per capita .0005841 .0004585 
Trade 2.048736 9.993224 
Peace Years -.0500851 .0461963 
Military Aid (t-1) 1.003327*** .0044229 
CONSTANT 14.98875 25.28672 
N = 1784 
Overall R2 = 0.970 
* = p < .10 
** = p < .05 
*** = p < .01 
Note: Dependent variable is the level of military aid given to the target country at time t. 
 
 
 
5.2 The Comprehensive Tests 
 Testing these processes individually has been the standard practice for scholars 
engaged in foreign policy analysis. But I argue that the decision to use force or to use 
sanctions are related to one another, and the decision to employ a given foreign policy 
tool at the expense of employing a different, competing tool is a simultaneous decision 
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and one that should be modeled as such. Consequently, the results of the next two 
models represent a first effort to demonstrate the simultaneous nature of the foreign 
policy decision. 
 Table 6 displays the results of the bivariate probit analysis, where the dependent 
variables were the decision to use economic sanctions and the decision to use military 
force. The first thing to note about Table 6 is the correlation statistic (log-likelihood ratio 
test of equation independence) for the bivariate probit, which clearly demonstrates that 
the processes are related. 
In terms of substantive results, the results are similar in meaning as those for the 
individual tests of the use of economic sanctions and military force. But in the bivariate 
probit model, one is able to directly compare the coefficients across the equations. So, 
for example, one can see that high unemployment for Democratic presidents makes the 
deployment of economic sanctions more likely but makes the use of military force less 
likely. The inverse is true for Republican presidents; military force is more likely under 
periods of high unemployment, though the finding is not statistically significant. The 
domestic politics variables perform reasonably well in the economic sanctions model, 
but perform much less well in the use of force model. 
By contrast, the international and target-specific variables perform quite well in 
both models, a finding which is discussed in greater detail later. In the sanctions model, 
virtually all of the international variables are significant and in the expected direction. In 
the force model, one can see that human rights, democracy level of the target, wealth, 
and peaceful history are significant.  
 34 
Table 6: Bivariate Probit Results of the Decision to Use Force or Sanctions 
Variable Name Coefficient SE 
Sanctions 
  
Unemployment .3407782** .1432929 
Inflation -.2372915 .218437 
Divided Govt. .0244923 .250156 
Ideology .3959016 .7111151 
Ideology*Unemployment -.3031373** .1523547 
Ideology*Inflation .3099786 .2346079 
Electoral Cycle -.0905307 .0634317 
Human Rights -.1993459*** .0272879 
Political Stability -.0785778*** .0262913 
Democracy -.0137297* .0083941 
Power 24.42255*** 4.316097 
GDP per capita .0000327** .0000155 
Trade 1.723914*** .3187897 
Peace Years -.0032201** .0015204 
Military Aid (t-1) -.0001232 .0001377 
CONSTANT -1.787391** .8455543 
Force   
Unemployment -.1598788 .2653156 
Inflation .0063511 .3844362 
Divided Govt. -.4546181 .5353749 
Ideology -2.252112* 1.415744 
Ideology*Unemployment .353291 .2793945 
Ideology*Inflation .0588247 .4128652 
Electoral Cycle .041069 .121009 
Human Rights -.3416313*** .0582769 
Political Stability -.0516102 .0394838 
Democracy -.0292388* .0169434 
Power 11.25277* 7.087925 
GDP per capita .0000685** .0000299 
Trade .5131863 .6606506 
Peace Years -.0050342* .0027666 
Military Aid (t-1) -.0000272 .0002205 
CONSTANT -.3186156 1.771473 
N =1802 Log-likelihood test of equation 
independence: chi2 = 21.2576, 
prob. > chi2 = 0.00 
* = p < .10 
** = p < .05 
*** = p < .01 
Note: Dependent variables are the decision to use economic sanctions and military force. 
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 Table 7 presents results from the seemingly unrelated regression analysis of the 
choice between giving military aid and giving economic aid. As with the bivariate probit 
results, the first thing to consider is how related are these processes? The correlation 
statistic demonstrates that they are connected, though considerably less connected than 
in the case of economic sanctions and military force. It can also be inferred from the 
goodness of fit statistic (R2) that the models do a reasonably good job at explaining the 
variance in the equations. 
 The results of the model demonstrate the relative importance of domestic 
political considerations to decisions even as technical as foreign aid allocation. Here 
again, one can directly compare the coefficients across the models. Consider, for 
example, the role of domestic economic performance in determining aid levels. 
Republican presidents facing high levels of unemployment give more aid (both military 
and economic) than do Democratic presidents facing a similar set of economic 
conditions. Indeed, many of the domestic political considerations seem to be quite 
relevant to presidential decisions concerning aid allocation. The electoral clock, not 
statistically significant in models of economic sanctions of the use of military force, is 
important for presidents when determining how much aid to allocate to a target country.  
 With respect to the international and target-specific variables, the results in Table 
7 suggest that the factors controlled for in the model matter more for economic aid 
decisions than for military aid decisions. GDP, political stability, and level of democracy 
all reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the economic aid model, but 
not in the military aid model. 
 36 
Table 7: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Foreign Aid 
 
Variable Name Coefficient SE 
Economic Aid   
Unemployment -22.47288*** 8.911679 
Inflation 22.39445* 13.10371 
Divided Govt. -27.38553* 17.10701 
Ideology -41.21163 45.92407 
Ideology*Unemployment 24.91413*** 9.464219 
Ideology*Inflation -23.94848* 13.95061 
Electoral Cycle 8.378093** 3.767799 
Human Rights .6950568 1.77584 
Political Stability 5.160219*** 1.829161 
Democracy 2.024563*** .5229058 
Power 5536.928*** 383.777 
GDP per capita -.0051129*** .0010094 
Trade 84.32815*** 22.00031 
Peace Years -.4637034*** .1017021 
Military Aid (t-1) .687537*** .0097372 
CONSTANT 98.35148* 55.66929 
Military Aid   
Unemployment -2.08247 4.029768 
Inflation 1.952136 5.925359 
Divided Govt. -2.905796 7.735612 
Ideology -47.22204** 20.76639 
Ideology*Unemployment 6.490922* 4.279622 
Ideology*Inflation .8309152 6.308323 
Electoral Cycle -1.233778 1.70376 
Human Rights -.8984922 .8030164 
Political Stability -.6275113 .8271276 
Democracy .019595 .2364526 
Power 36.4039 173.54 
GDP per capita .0005841 .0004564 
Trade 2.048736 9.94831 
Peace Years -.0500851 .0459886 
Military Aid (t-1) 1.003327*** .0044031 
CONSTANT 14.98875 25.17307 
N = 1784 
Correlation of Equations: 0.237 
* = p < .10 
** = p < .05 
*** = p < .01 
Note: Dependent variables are the levels of economic and military aid given to target country at time 
t. 
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5.3 Discussion 
 What do the tests say about the theory and hypotheses discussed above? The 
empirical analyses show some limited support for only two of the hypotheses previously 
articulated. Republican presidents are more involved in foreign policy during periods of 
high domestic unemployment, when they can best divert the attention of the domestic 
public away from the poor economic conditions. The bad economy, as measured by high 
unemployment, allows Republican presidents the chance to engage in something at 
which they are credible: fighting wars, sanctioning other states, or giving aid. 
Democrats, by contrast, become more involved when there is high inflation, but only 
with respect to giving higher levels of economic aid. 
 In general, though, the hypotheses were not well supported. What, then, can we 
make of the hypotheses that were not supported? Divided government, the central 
variable of interest in hypotheses three and four, was not important in most of the 
models (the lone exception was the economic aid model). This can be explained, in part I 
think, by the limited occurrences of unified government in the sample; one party rule 
occurred only during the first two years of Bill Clinton’s first term. As more data on 
certain independent and control variables become available, a clearer pattern of 
Congressional constraining of the president may emerge. 
 The results did not show that Republican presidents were always more likely 
than Democratic presidents to use force, merely that they were willing to use force under 
a limited set of conditions. This finding provides only limited support for hypothesis 
one. When we consider the time period under study (1981-2000), a possible explanation 
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for this becomes clear. Reagan and Bush held the presidency during the Cold War, when 
American presidents were naturally more reluctant to pursue military options. By 
contrast, Clinton was president at the beginning of the post-Cold War period, and has 
ambitious nation-building plans and envisioned an enlargement of the democratic 
community. With a greater number of administrations in future studies, we may see 
more instances of Republican aggression and Democratic pacifism. 
 Hypotheses six and seven, concerning how the domestic economy may shape 
presidential responses to international events, received limited support. It should be 
noted, though, that Republican presidents will almost always be more involved in 
international affairs than will Democratic ones; Democrats receive few domestic 
political benefits from focusing on foreign affairs. The results do demonstrate that in 
some cases politicians become less involved in foreign affairs in response to domestic 
economic considerations; Republican presidents give less economic aid during periods 
of high inflation and Democrats give less economic aid during periods of high 
unemployment. 
 While hypothesis five (presidents use force early in their administrations) was 
not supported by the data, the election cycle did manifest its importance in the decision 
to use sanctions late in a president’s term. This would seem to conform to the idea that 
presidents choose foreign policy options late in their terms because these options carry 
lower electoral costs (Gaubatz 1991; 1999). 
 One final thought concerning these results merits some discussion. What the 
results show is that domestic politics may not always be the most salient consideration 
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for presidents facing situations that call for military force. Clearly, the results show that 
the international and target-specific factors contribute much more to the decisions 
presidents make in national security than do domestic politics. This result is not 
surprising, given the realist project in international relations and the multitude of 
empirical results confirming the existence of a democratic peace. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 What value has this project added to our understanding of the process of foreign 
policy making in America? I argue that the value is added on both theoretical and 
modeling grounds. Certainly, one thing to be taken away from these results is that 
domestic politics matters for some types of foreign policy choices but not for others. 
This is one place where the theory discussed above adds some value to the present 
understanding of the foreign policy making process. Thus, theories such as realism that 
would totally ignore or otherwise downplay the role of domestic politics in shaping 
leader decisions are missing a key element. 
 In addition, the results of the comprehensive tests show a connection between the 
decision to use military force and the decision to use economic sanctions for American 
presidents. American presidents face a choice between doing something (using 
sanctions, using force) and doing nothing. After making that decision, presidents face a 
simultaneous decision as to which tool of foreign policy to employ from a very wide 
range of related options (indeed, a much wider range than was tested for here). 
 Testing these decisions in isolation of one another has been the standard practice 
for those studying the foreign policy decision process. Given data constraints and the 
research interests of individual scholars, the decision to study the choice/employment of 
one foreign policy tool in isolation from other choices can sometimes be understood as a 
pragmatic one. When this is the case, we should not expect scholars to engage in 
simultaneous examinations of the foreign policy process. However, the results of the 
comprehensive tests show that in some cases foreign policy choices are linked in 
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significant ways, and thus scholars should aim to model the decision process as a choice 
between options, and not merely as the decision to use only one tool. The consequence 
of continuing to model the choices as isolated is that the results will be biased and thus 
less reliable. 
 The empirical results have substantive implications for American leaders. For the 
Congress, the results show that members of Congress have not done enough to constrain 
the executive in foreign affairs during periods of divided government, playing only a 
relatively marginal role in constraining the executive in his aid allocation decisions. 
Congress has many tools at its disposal to accomplish this, including passing legislation 
that is contrary to the president’s stated policy preference, using the threat of defeating 
the president’s favored policy, using procedural legislation to change the process of 
foreign policy making, and by framing the debates about foreign policy issues (Lindsay 
and Ripley 1993). With a little more effort and more coordination by the opposition 
party in Congress, its members can reduce the institutional advantages of the president 
and exert a more powerful influence in foreign affairs. 
 The results show that the president is constrained by certain domestic factors 
beyond his control. Certainly, the president receives a great share of the electoral credit 
or blame for the performance of the domestic economy, and not always deservedly so 
(Fair 1978). The results show that diversionary uses of forces may continue for 
presidents facing tough economic times, but presidents should take the counsel of 
political scientists and realize that any gains in popularity coming from diversionary uses 
of military force are short-lived (Bowen 1989). 
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 Additionally, presidents should always remember that they possess many options 
for dealing with foreign policy problems. Certainly, economic sanctions and military 
force are prominent among these options. So, too, are economic and military aid 
packages. Presidents should carefully consider what sacrifices and trade-offs will be 
made by selecting one policy over another. Presidents should also be mindful of what 
they are asking American citizens and members of the target country to give up in order 
to achieve the American president’s foreign policy goals. 
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